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ABSTRACT
The property tax is a major expenditure for property owners, and a critical source of
revenue for cities and towns. There are competing theories about the nature of property
tax incidence in multifamily rental housing, for which empirical studies provide limited
evidence. The Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS) represents the first time
information has been systematically collected about the expenses , revenues and other
characteristics of multifamily rental housing in the United States. This thesis had two
goals. The first was to explore the POMS data to see what information it offers about the
relationship between property taxes, rents, values, and other characteristics of rental
housing. The second was to evaluate the usefulness of the POMS data for estimating the
incidence of the tax.
A few results stand out after exploration of the POMS data. A significant share of
properties reported effective tax rates well above the typical tax rate for cities and towns.
These properties had more units and lower values than average, and less amenities. They
were also more likely to be located in central cities in the Northeast and Midwest.
Effective property tax rates for individual properties varied widely by region, and were
significantly related to several key property characteristics.
Analysis shows that the POMS data is not adequate to estimate the incidence of the
property tax, chiefly because it does not provide enough variables to control for unit and
neighborhood quality, hence differences in rents. Another significant drawback is the
limited information about the location of properties. Future research might focus on
finding ways to link this data with other sources of information to improve its usefulness.
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Introduction
In 1998, a press release issued by the U.S. Census Bureau announced that property taxes were
the leading complaint of owners of rental housing in the U.S.' This statement was based on the
results of the 1995 Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS), the first known survey of its
kind in the United States. 2 There is nothing particularly surprising about this result. The
property tax is one of the most contentious issues in local politics in the United States. It is a
highly conspicuous tax, assessed on what is often the largest component of an individual or
household's wealth. At the same time, it is one of the major revenue sources of U.S. cities, and
is used to fund the education of children in public schools. Many elected officials believe the tax
is regressive, imposing a heavier burden on households with lower incomes. 3
According to economic theory, owners of rental property do not necessarily bear the burden of
their property taxes. A portion, or even the total cost of the tax, may be passed on to renters in
the form of higher rents. The extent to which this burden is passed forward depends on the
relative elasticities of supply and demand in the rental market, and is referred to as the incidence
of the tax.
There are competing theoretical views about the incidence of property taxes, for which empirical
studies provide conflicting evidence. Measuring the incidence of the property tax is difficult
because it involves an analysis of the relationship between property taxes, rents and property
values, all of which are interrelated. The POMS represents the first time a significant amount of
information has been systematically collected about operating expenses and revenues for
multifamily rental housing. It provides at the minimum a starting point for supplementing the
sparse literature on tax incidence. This thesis draws selectively on this national data set to
examine the relationship between tax payments, rent, property value, and other property
"Property Taxes and Parking Restrictions Were Leading Complaints of Multifamily Property Owners, Census
Bureau Says," United States Department of Commerce Press Release (December 2, 1998), 1.
2 Howard Savage, "What We Have Learned about Properties, Owners, and Tenants From the 1995 Property Owners
and Managers Survey," Current Housing Reports, U.S. Department of Commerce Economics and Statistics
Administration (October 1998), 1.
3Helen F. Ladd, Local Government Tax and Land Use Policies in the United States (Northampton, MA: Edward
Elger Publishing Inc., 1998), 25.
characteristics, to assess the implications of the POMS for further studies of tax incidence in
multifamily rental housing.
The research aims to answer the following questions:
" What does the POMS data set show about the relationship between property taxes, revenues,
expenses and property values in U.S. multifamily rental housing?
" Generally, what can we learn from the POMS data about whether higher property taxes are
translated into higher apartment rents?
* What information could be used to supplement the POMS data, to more effectively assess the
incidence of property tax incidence in multifamily rental properties?
Chapter 1 provides an overview of previous studies of property taxes as they relate to
multifamily rental housing. It reviews the theoretical debates surrounding the incidence of the
tax, and discusses empirical studies of tax incidence in the context of multifamily rental housing.
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the POMS, and a summary of main findings about the
characteristics of multifamily rental housing in the United States. This provides background for
a more detailed analysis of taxes, operating expenses, rents and apartment values in Chapter 3.
Chapter 4 examines property tax incidence in the POMS data. None of the statistical models are
successful in estimating the incidence of the tax. The rest of the chapter discusses the likely
reasons for these results, and their implications about future analysis of property tax incidence.
The conclusion includes a summary of major findings and suggested directions for future
research.
Chapter 1: A Summary of Previous Studies of Property Tax Incidence in
Multifamily Rental Housing
This chapter provides a survey of studies of property tax incidence, focusing on the implications
for multifamily rental housing. Competing theoretical views on the incidence of the tax are
presented. Following are summaries of the results of several empirical works, including studies
of property tax incidence in both commercial properties and multifamily rental housing.
What is property tax incidence?
Property tax incidence refers to the issue of who pays the cost of property taxes when the owners
and occupiers (renters) of space are different. Because owners have the legal obligation to pay
the cost of property taxes, rather than renters, circumstances may arise when property taxes are
not fully passed on in the form of rents. If this occurs, landlords pay for the town services
consumed by the renters.
As an example, consider a town with owners and renters, where services are paid for by property
taxes. Owners charge the highest rents they can, given the market. Renters choose where to live
based on a variety of considerations, including location, amenities, and the types of services
provided in the town. If there were an increase in the property tax rate, how much of the cost
would owners be able to recover in increased rents? In the short run, this depends on the nature
of demand. If tenants are not mobile (demand is inelastic), landlords can pass on the cost of their
increased tax payments by charging higher rents. However, if tenants are mobile, they will only
accept an increase in rents to the extent that they also receive increased services. Feasibly, if all
of the tax revenue were used to fund improved services, and those services were valued at their
cost by the tenants in the town, landlords could raise rents by the same amount as their increased
tax payments. As a result, the incidence of the tax would lie fully with the tenants. If, on the
other hand, the property tax increase was not accompanied by an increase in services, or the
services were not valued by the renters at their cost, then apartment owners would not be able to
increase rents by as much as their increased tax payments. In this circumstance the burden of the
tax falls on the owner, and the tax is capitalized back into the value of the property. 4
4 Denise DiPasquale and William Wheaton, Urban Economics and Real Estate Markets (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1996), 342.
Theoretically, in the long run the incidence of the tax always lies with landowners. In the long
run, tenants are mobile, and demand is elastic. Tenants are only willing to pay rents that reflect
the value of the housing and services they receive, and any cost above that amount is capitalized
back into the value of the land.
Competing Theories of Property Tax Incidence
Broadly, there are three theoretical views of property taxation, the "traditional," "new," and
"benefit" views. Each results in different conclusions about the incidence of the property tax.
The following summary is based primarily on Wassmer.5
The "traditional view" was introduced by Netzer in 1966. The traditional view disregards the
benefits from services received by residents, assuming that they are not strongly related to the
amount of taxes paid. Netzer concluded that owners of property do not bear the burden of the
tax because it is fully passed on to renters. This implies that the property tax is regressive, since
tenants with lower income pay a greater portion of their income in rent.
Mieszkowski introduced the "new view" in 1972. He argued that if all jurisdictions were to have
the same tax rate, it would simply reduce the returns to land across all properties.
For that reason, he focused on differences in tax rates, and the extent to which they have an
impact on prices and resource allocation:
Land is immobile, but its share of costs is too small to absorb the entire
differential tax burden. The excise tax effect means that some of the
burden of the tax is shifted forward to consumers, whose demands must be
less than perfectly elastic at the jurisdiction level. 6
According to his theory, property owners bear the burden of part of the tax. This implies that the
property tax can be progressive, since property owners tend to have more income than people
who do not own property.
s Robert Wassmer, "Property Taxation, Property Base, and Property Value: An Empirical Test of the New View",
National Tax Journal 46 (June 1993), 136.
6 McDonald, John, " Incidence of the Property Tax on Commercial Real Estate: The Case of Downtown Chicago,"
National Tax Journal 46 (June 1993), 110
The "benefit view" was introduced by Hamilton in 1976. It makes the case that property taxes
are a relatively efficient form of user charges for local public services. Taxes are shifted forward
to renters, who make use of town services. If this is the case, then differential tax rates between
jurisdictions reflect differences in service quality, and property owners should not bear the
burden of the tax. Mieszkowski and Zodrow reject the benefit view, arguing that it would
require perfect zoning and capitalization.7
Empirical Studies
Broadly, empirical studies of property tax incidence can be divided into two groupings. The first
includes studies of owner occupied housing, which analyze how property taxation affects home
values. This is essentially a question of capitalization. The second group includes studies of tax
incidence in multifamily housing, and the extent to which property taxes are shifted forward in
the form of higher rents. In both situations, the approach is generally to specify a model
containing tax and non-tax variables as "independent" explanatory variables, with either housing
value or rental receipts as the dependent variable. Thus, the issues of capitalization and shifting
are generally analyzed separately.8 However, the two issues are intertwined: whatever cost is not
shifted onto the renter should eventually be capitalized back into the land.
Most studies of property tax incidence in multifamily housing focus on the differences in tax
rates between communities in the same region, to determine the extent to which these differences
impact rents. Generally, researchers specify a hedonic equation, with rent as the dependent
variable, and the actual or effective tax rate as one of the explanatory variables. Renters are
usually assumed to be mobile, and are expected to choose where to live based on a variety of
factors, including the level of services and rents. According to theory, renters bear the burden of
7 Wassmer, op. cit., 139.
8 Richard Dusansky, Melvin Ingber, and Nicholas Karatjas, "The Impact of Property Taxation on Housing Values
and Rents," Journal of Urban Economics 10 (September 1981), 240.
Table 1.1: Summary of Previous Studies of the Incidence of Property Tax Differentials on
Rental Housing (adapted from Carroll and Yinger)
Incidence of Region and Time Dependent Property Tax
Tax Period Variable Variable(s)
Orr (1968) Fails to find 31 municipalities Median Equalized
evidence of in the Boston gross rent property tax
shifting. MSA, 1960 per median rate for all
rooms of all property.
housing
units.
Heinberg and Fails to find 23 municipalities Median Equalized
Oates (1970) evidence of in the Boston gross rent property tax
shifting. MSA, 1960 per median rate for all
rooms of all property
rental units.
Orr (1970) Shifting of 46 31 municipalities Median Equalized
percent of tax. in the Boston gross rent property tax





Hyman and Shifting of 60 115 municipalities Median Equalized
Pasour (1973) percent of tax. in North Carolina, gross rent. property tax
1970 rate for all
property
Dusansky, Shifting of 62 municipalities Median Equalized
Ingber and between 62 and in Suffolk County, gross rent. property tax






Carroll and Indirect shifting 147 municipalities Median Effective tax
Yinger (1994) of 11%. in the Boston gross rent. rate.
I___ I____ SMSA, 1980 1 _ _1
the tax in areas where the demand for property is price inelastic, and land owners bear the burden
when demand is price elastic.
The first two studies shown in the table above fail to find any evidence of tax payments shifting
forward to renters. These provide evidence in favor of the "new view," where landlords bear the
burden of a significant portion of their taxes. Hyman and Pasour, and Dusansky, Ingber and
Karatjas found, however, that a sizeable portion of the tax was passed forward to renters.
Caroll and Yinger looked at 147 cities and towns in the Boston SMSA in 1980, in order to
determine if the property tax is a benefits tax. They differentiated between direct shifting of the
tax burden, and indirect shifting, which occurs when property tax increases are used to fund
improved services. The research showed that it is unlikely that the property tax is ever a benefits
tax. For the property tax to be a benefit tax, the first criterion is that the full cost of the tax must
be passed on to renters. Landlords will always prefer to set rents at the level where any increase
in property taxes would exactly offset the landlords increase in taxes. Meanwhile, tenants would
always prefer to increase the tax until the net benefit to them is zero - they are indifferent to
property tax increases, because beyond a point, any extra burden will be paid by the landlord.9
The tax can only be a benefit tax if it is set at the level preferred by the landlord, which implies
complete shifting of the tax into higher rents. However, landlords do not usually have the
political power to set the property tax rate. If they are nonresidents, they may not even be able to
vote. Hence, the tax rate is more likely to be set at the level that renters and homeowners prefer.
Furthermore, "without either perfectly mobile tenants or immobile landlords, the property tax
rate cannot be set to satisfy the benefit-tax conditions for both landlords and tenants; that is, the
two conditions are incompatible."' 0
Carroll and Yinger find that landlords in the Boston MSA would bear a large portion of a
property tax increase, in all cities and towns in their analysis (between $.747 and $.909 for every
$1.00 property tax increase). They conclude that the tax is far from being a benefit tax, since this
is obviously not the level that would be preferred by landlords. However,
9 Robert J. Carroll and John Yinger, "Is the Property Tax a Benefits Tax? The Case of Rental Housing," National
Tax Journal 47 June 1994 #2, 303.
tenant mobility ensures that, at the margin, the property tax operates like a
benefit tax from the point of view of tenants. Tenant mobility does not
ensure, however, that the tax rate is set so that tenants receive $1 of
benefits for every $1 increase in property taxes."
In other words, a $1 tax increase appears to result in services which are worth less than $1 to
tenants. They conclude, "either property taxes are not set at an optimal level, or the marginal
benefit to other city residents, presumably homeowners, far exceed their tax costs." 12 The "new
view" says that property tax differentials will be borne by renters only if they are immobile.
Carroll and Yinger show that renters are willing to bear some of the cost of the tax differential, if
they reflect increased services.
Carroll and Yinger also point out that there are decreasing marginal benefits to tax increases,
meaning that a tax increase in a high-cost town should lead to a smaller amount of increased
services, other things being equal. Furthermore, their data shows that high residential property
tax rates do not necessarily translate into high public service quality. One of the reasons for this
is because the cost to provide services varies between towns (ex: fire protection given different
aged buildings). Cities and towns also receive different levels of state and federal aid.
Therefore, the tax rate, or total tax payments, says nothing, necessarily, about the level of
services in a town.
There are also several empirical studies that explore the question of tax incidence in the context
of commercial property. This is essentially the same issue, simplified by the fact that office
space is not a major recipient of municipal services. Because of this, the question is one of pure
differences in tax rates. In Wheaton's study of commercial property taxes in the Boston area, he
uses a hedonic rent equation to determine the incidence of the tax. Because the tax rate never
has a significant impact on gross rents per square foot, he concludes that the burden of the tax is




not passed forward to renters. Consequently, landowners must bear the burden of the tax.13 This
result contradicts the "traditional" view. On the other hand, Clapp's study of the location of
offices within regions showed a statistically significant relationship between taxes paid and gross
rents. However, the tax payments were not controlled for size, which makes it difficult to have
confidence in these results.14 McDonald's study of commercial tax incidence considers the
impact not of differential tax rates, but rather, differential assessments within Chicago. He
concludes that 45 percent of an increase in property taxes per square foot would be shifted
forward to tenants. 15 Man's study of tax incidence in the Phoenix metropolitan area draws
similar conclusions. She finds that 40 percent of intra-jurisdictional differences are passed on to
renters, and 30 percent of inter-jurisdictional differences are passed on to renters.16
Assessment Error
Numerous studies attest to the fact that assessed values do not necessarily reflect market values.
Assessor error can lead to horizontal inequities across similar properties.' 7 For example, a 1993
grand jury investigation in Florida determined that the state property tax system was skewed, and
that assessments weren't fair across the board. Further complicating this issue is the fact that
owners who receive assessments that are too high are likely to appeal the assessment in court in
an attempt to have it lowered. On the other side, owners who receive property assessments that
under-value their properties celebrate their good fortune. Because of this, the average
assessment is likely to be below the average market value. A study by Sirmans, Diskin and
Friday shows that vertical inequity may also exist in some areas, meaning that within a
jurisdiction, assessed value as a percent of market value can differ in a systematic way across
different value levels for homes.19
13 William Wheaton, "The Incidence of Inter-Jurisdictional Differences in Commercial Taxes," National Tax
Journal 37 (December 1984), 515.
14 McDonald, op. cit., 109.
s Ibid., 110.
16 Mann, Joyce Y., "The Incidence of Differential Commercial Property Taxes: Empirical Evidence," National Tax
Journal 48 (December 1995), 479.
17 Wassmer, op. cit., 139.
18 G. Stacy Sirmans, Barry A. Diskin, and H. Swint Friday, "Vertical Inequity in the Taxation of Real Property,"
National Tax Journal 48 (December 1995), 71.
'
9TIid., 71.
In McDonald's study of commercial property tax incidence in Chicago, he finds assessed value
per square foot to be unrelated to gross rents. According to McDonald, "the apparent difficulty
with establishing accurate estimates of market valuations turns the property tax into an
exogenous - some might say arbitrary - variable." 20
Property Taxes and the Property Tax Base
A related issue is the effect of the property tax rate on the tax base. A study by Helen F. Ladd
and Katharine L. Bradbury showed that increases in tax rates can have a negative impact on local
property values. Based on their analysis of 86 U.S. cities, Ladd and Bradbury estimate the long
run elasticity of a city's property tax base as -0.15.21 According to Ladd and Bradbury,
Estimating the relationship between the market value of city property tax
bases and city property tax rates would be relatively straightforward if tax
rates could be viewed as exogenous... perusal of the laws affecting city
property taxes, however, suggest that in most cases a city's property tax
rate, expressed as a fraction of full market value, is not independent of the
22
city's tax base.
This is not surprising, since tax rates are set to provide a certain level of town or city revenue.
However, it also indicates that in cities that rely heavily on the property tax for revenues, higher
tax rates may result in a vicious cycle of declining values and increased tax rates.
Summary of Obstacles to Measuring Property Tax Incidence
The above discussion illustrates the complexities involved in measuring the incidence of the
property tax. First, tax, value, and rent are all endogenous variables: each has an impact on the
value of the others. Furthermore, a complete estimation of the incidence of the tax requires not
only property level operating expense and income data, but also information about local tax rates
and public services. Using actual or effective jurisdictional tax rates as an explanatory variable
is also problematic, since the property tax rate may be simultaneously determined with rent and
property value. Compounding all this, the taxes paid by individual properties may be an arbitrary
20 McDonald, op. cit., 120.
21 Helen F. Ladd and Katharine L. Bradbury, "City Taxes and Property Tax Bases," National Tax Journal 41
(December 1988), 521. They found that a 10% increase in the property tax rate decreases the property tax base by
1.5 percent over the long run.
variable due to differential assessments. The detailed information about property level revenue
and expenses provided by the POMS may be a useful supplement to these efforts. The following
chapter introduces the POMS, and chapter 3 provides more detailed analysis of the relationship
between multifamily rental rents, expenses, values and taxes.
22 Ibid., 506.
Chapter 2: An Overview of the Property Owners and Managers Survey
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the POMS data set, and a summary
of main survey findings. Chapter 3 presents a more detailed analysis of multifamily rental
properties, their taxes, effective tax rates, rents, operating expenses, and property values.
The Property Owners and Managers Survey (POMS) was sponsored by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, and conducted in 1995 by the U.S. Census Bureau. The
POMS was the first national survey of its kind, providing valuable new information about rental
housing in the United States. The purpose of the survey was to gain a better understanding of the
supply side of the rental housing market, by interviewing property owners and managers who
provide rental housing. The survey asked owners and managers of privately held rental housing
questions about structural, financial, ownership and management characteristics of their
properties. Owners were also polled about their attitudes about ownership, plans for their
properties, and views on governmental regulations.
The universe was approximately 29,300,000 privately owned rental housing units in the U.S.
The initial sample was approximately 16,300 housing units, taken from properties included in the
1993 American Housing Survey.24 A unit (and the property containing the unit) was included in
the survey if it was a privately owned rental unit at the time of the 1993 housing survey, and was
still a rental unit in 1995. A unit was considered a rental unit if it was currently rented, occupied
rent-free by a person other than the owner, or vacant but available for rent. Publicly owned
properties (public and military housing, or housing owned by another federal agency) were not
included in the survey. Information was collected between November 1995 and June 1996.
Separate surveys were given to owners of single- and multi-unit properties. The resulting multi-
unit data set contained 5754 observations.
23 Savage, op. cit., 1.
24Property Owners and Managers Survey Technical Documentation, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington
D.C.: February, 1997.25
"Property Owners and Managers Survey: Source and Accuracy Statement," U.S. Census Bureau website
(www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/poms.html). Properties used primarily for vacation homes were also
excluded. Note that properties built or converted to rental between 1993 and 1995 were not included in the sample.
The data permit analysis at either the property or unit level. Information about the location of
each property is very limited. Properties are identified as in one of the four census regions
(Northeast, South, East or West), inside or outside a metropolitan area, and inside or outside a
central city. States, metropolitan areas, and cities are not specified. The lack of detailed
information about location is one of the most significant limitations of the POMS data, since it
does not allow differentiation at the level of the jurisdiction or market area.
Table 2.1: Census Regions
Northeast Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont
Midwest Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota,
Wisconsin
South Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia
West Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah,
I Washington, Wyoming
Source: Technical Documentation for Property Owners and Managers Survey, 1995-
1996, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau
of the Census
The POMS collected information about the following aspects of rental housing:
* Ownership: characteristics of owners, ownership structure, attitudes toward the property, and
reasons for owning.
" Property and unit characteristics: age of structure, amenities, and recent capital
improvements. Also, estimations of current value, value relative to other properties, and
recent changes in property value.
* Financial characteristics: method of and reasons for acquiring the property and mortgage
information. The data also include detailed operating income and expense information,
including rents from both residential and commercial space, and itemized expenses from the
previous year.
" Management policies: procedures for handling maintenance, tenant screening and turnover.
* Governmental benefits and regulations: property benefits received, such as tax credits and
abatements, and participation in the federal Section 8 rental housing subsidy program.
POMS Data Overview
The following summary, unless otherwise specified, presents property-level information based
on the entire multi-unit data set. This summary relies heavily on a U.S. Census report, "What
We have Learned About Properties, Owners and Tenants From the 1995 Property Owners and
26
Management Survey," by Howard Savage.
Owner Characteristics
Most properties were owned by individual or partnership owners, half of whom owned only one
property. However, the breakdown of ownership types varied considerably between small and
Figure 2.1: Ownership Type
MIndividual 3% 8%





0 Other 86% 25%
All Properties 50 or More Units
large properties. Small properties were most likely to be owned by an individual, at 90 percent.
In contrast, only 32 percent of the owners of properties with over 50 units were owned by
individuals. Larger properties were more likely to be owned by partnerships (38 percent),
corporations (11 percent), or non-profits (6 percent). As of 1995, Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs) owned a negligible percentage (1 percent) of residential properties in the United States,
but because their properties tend to be larger, this represented an estimated 417,612 units (2
percent).27
26 Savage, op. cit., 1.
2 7
"Multi-family Unit Tables: Owner Characteristics," U.S. Census Bureau website.
Roughly one-fourth of multifamily properties were owner occupied. This percentage was
significantly lower for larger properties. 29 percent of small properties (less than 5 units) had
owners living on the premises, while this was only true for 3 percent of properties with 50 or
more units. Owners of large properties seemed more pleased with their properties, generally.
Eighty-seven percent of owners of properties with 50 or more units reported that they would buy
their property again. Meanwhile, only about two-thirds of the owners of small and medium-
sized properties said they would buy their property again.
The primary reason investors acquired rental property was to receive income from rents, at 33
percent. The second most common reason for acquisition was for use as a residence. Smaller
properties were more likely to be bought for this purpose: a third of all properties under 5 units
were purchased for use as a residence. Only 10 percent of all owners purchased their property
for long-term capital gain. However, 22 percent of properties over 50 units were acquired for
this purpose.
Half of multifamily property owners were between 45 and 64 years old, 85 percent were white
(94 percent for large properties), 8 percent were African American, 6 percent were Hispanic and
4 percent were Asian or Pacific Islander.
Property Characteristics
As shown in Table 2.2, the Table 2.2: Location of Multi-Unit PropertiesDistribution Within Region
distribution of properties among % of CentralTotal Total City Suburb Rural
census regions was relatively All Properties 5754 100% 52% 37% 10%
uniform, with the largest number of Northeast 1348 23% 56% 38% 7%Midwest 1287 22% 48% 36% 16%
properties in the South. Just over South 1770 31% 54% 35% 11%West 1349 23% 51% 42% 7%
half of all properties were located in
central cities, and only 10 percent were outside of metropolitan areas. The northeast was the
most urban, with 56 percent of properties located in central cities. Of the four regions, the
midwest is the least urban, with less than half of all properties located in central cities and 16
percent located in rural areas.
46% of all units were in properties with more than 50 units in 1995, up from 43 percent in
1991.28 Larger properties also tended to be newer: 85 percent of properties over 50 units were
built since 1960, which was only true for half the properties as a whole. Larger properties were
also more likely to be located in the South and West. While over half of multifamily rental
properties are in the northeast and Midwest, only about a third of properties over 50 units were
located in these regions.
58 percent of multifamily properties made a profit or broke even, and 27 percent had a loss. 16
percent of those surveyed didn't know if the property was profitable during the previous year.29
Only 3 percent of properties over 50 units reported losses, but a high 37 percent reported that
they didn't know whether the property was profitable. Researchers from the National
Multihousing Council point out that this may be because the interviews were done in early 1996,
before the previous year's profitability was determined.30
The most common capital improvements during the years 1990 to 1995 were bathroom
renovations, kitchen facility replacements, and heating system upgrades. 31 Only 12 percent of
properties included handicap-accessible units.
According to owners, 38 percent of properties housed mostly low-income people, and 39 percent
were occupied by mostly middle-income people. Only 3 percent of multifamily properties had
mostly high-income renters, and these renters were more likely to be in properties with more
units. According to a report by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development based
on the POMS data, roughly half of multifamily units qualified as affordable according to HUD
standards.3
28 "Highlights from HUD's New Survey of Property Owners and Managers," Research Notes, National
Multihousing Council (February 1997), 1. The 1991 figure was from the 1991 Residential Finance Survey
conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau.29 U.S. Department of Commerce Press Release, op. cit., 1.
30 "Highlights from HUD's New Survey of Property Owners and Managers," 1.
31 U.S. Department of Commerce Press Release, op. cit., 1.
32 "The Providers of Affordable Housing," U.S. Housing Market Conditions, 4'k Quarter 1996, U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, (February 1997), 2. Affordable
rental units are identified as those that a family with 50 percent of the HUD-adjusted median income could afford
without spending more than 30 percent of their income on rent.
Financial Characteristics
Average rental receipts per unit were $5,152.33 Operating income and expenses varied widely
among properties. Yearly median operating expenses per unit were $2,300. Large properties
had higher median operating expenses, at $3,300. This is likely due to regional cost differences,
and the fact that larger properties tend to be in more expensive cities. Three-quarters of units
were in mortgaged properties. Average mortgage expenses were $1,139 per unit, or 22 percent
of rental receipts.
Management Policies
About 21 percent of owners reported that they were seeking new tenants at the time of the
survey. Approximately one-quarter of properties with less than 5 units rejected tenants in the last
two years, and 85 percent of properties with 50 or more units. The main reasons tenants were
rejected for apartments were poor credit, insufficient income, and unfavorable references. 55
percent of the owners of multifamily properties were attempting to reduce tenant turnover by
redecorating or making other improvements. 27 percent of properties offered rent concessions to
retain residents. Larger properties were more likely to offer increased services as a means to
retain tenants. Owners at less than one percent of properties were trying to increase tenant
turnover.
The median amount of gross rental income spent on maintenance was 14 percent. Smaller
properties spent a smaller percent of income on maintenance.3 4
Governmental Benefits and Regulations
Overall, 7 percent of properties have Section 8 tenants, with larger properties more likely to
participate in the Section 8 program. 4 percent of properties participated in other Federal, state,
or local housing programs. Owners of larger properties were much more likely to know about
the Section 8 program, at 88 percent. Nearly half of small multifamily property owners did not
know about the program.
3 Emrath, Paul, "Property Owners and Managers Survey," Housing Economics 45 (July 1997), 7.
34 Savage, op. cit., 2.
When asked what governmental regulations made it more difficult to operate the property,
property taxes were consistently ranked highest, regardless of size of property. Parking was also
listed as a major complaint.
Limitations of the Data
An important consideration in analyzing the data are the rate and pattern of non-response to the
survey questions. Few categories were completed by all respondents, and many fundamental
questions had high rates of non-response. Financial information, in particular, was frequently
not reported. According to the Census Bureau, 40 percent of represented units did not provide
complete
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operating cost data.35 The category most responded to, advertising cost, had a 38 percent non-
response rate. Six of the twenty operating cost categories had over 50 percent non-response
rates. When tabulated by property size, the larger the property, the less likely the owner was to
respond to operating cost questions.
35 "Property Owners and Managers Survey: Source and Accuracy Statement," op. cit.
Tabulation of the survey responses revealed only 32 percent of individual owners responded to
all sixteen operating cost categories. This was slightly better than the response rate of properties
owned by limited partners (29 percent) and much better than the response rate of real estate
corporations (18 percent), the third largest owner type.
Chapter 3: An Exploration of Taxes, Revenues, Expenses and Property Values in
the POMS Data
This chapter builds on the overview provided in chapter 3, exploring the relationship between
tax payments, effective tax rates, operating costs and revenues, and property values. It
introduces the primary variables used in the property tax incidence analysis in chapter 4.
The POMS multi-unit data set includes 5754 properties, 2265 of which reported full information
about tax payments and value. As discussed previously, the POMS provides limited information
about the location of properties. The data can be sorted according to the four census regions,
Northeast, South, Midwest, and West. Properties were further classified according to whether
they are in a central city, outside the central city but within a metropolitan area (suburb), or
outside a metropolitan area (rural). The 2265 properties were relatively evenly spread among the
four census regions, with the highest percentage in the Northeast (29 percent), and the lowest in
the South (22 percent). Fifty-three percent of properties were in central cities, 33 percent were in
suburbs, and 14 percent were not located in metropolitan areas. Note that this differs from the
broader POMS sample, where the largest number of properties were in the South (31 percent),
and the smallest number were in the Midwest. Properties for which values and tax payments
were reported were also more likely to be located in rural areas.
Effective Tax Rates, Rents, Operating Costs, and Property Value
Because more specific information about the location of properties was not provided, real and
effective property tax rates by jurisdiction were not available for analysis. However, tax
payments were recorded in the survey along with operating expenses. The effective property tax
rate for each property was calculated as:
t = T/V
where t is the effective tax rate, T is the total annual real estate tax payment, and V is property
value. Owners estimated values, and their method for determining property values varied.
Estimations of value were based on assessments (either recent or adjusted
Table 3.1: Effective Property Tax Rates By Location
All Properties
Median Mean N %
Total 1.38% 1.68% 2,213 100%
Northeast 2.00% 2.25% 646 29%
Midwest 1.77% 1.98% 558 25%
South 1.17% 1.37% 484 22%
West 0.87% 0.97% 525 24%
Central City 1.42% 1.75% 1,168 53%
Suburb 1.37% 1.66% 741 33%
Outside MA 1.25% 1.47% 304 14%
In Northeast
Median Mean N %
Total 2.00% 2.25% 646 100%
Central City 2.13% 2.34% 356 55%
Suburb 2.00% 2.22% 230 36%
Outside MA 1.60% 1.78% 60 9%
In Midwest
Median Mean N %
Total 1.77% 1.98% 558 100%
Central City 1.76% 2.04% 273 49%
Suburb 1.91% 2.00% 170 30%








Median Mean N %
Total 1.17% 1.37% 484 100%
Central City 1.31% 1.54% 250 52%
Suburb 1.13% 1.31% 152 31%
Outside MA 0.86% 0.96% 82 17%
In West
Median Mean N %
Total 0.87% 0.95% 525 100%
Central City 0.87% 0.91% 289 55%
Suburb 0.91% 0.97% 189 36%
Outside MA 0.78% 1.11% 47 9%
Figure 3.1: Median Effective Tax Rates By Location
E Central City
Suburb
I I --.. O Outside MA
Northeast Midwest South West
for inflation), the original purchase price adjusted for inflation, market values of equivalent
properties, or capitalized net operating income.
Properties with an effective property tax rate greater than 7.5 percent were excluded from the
analysis. 36 Table 3.1 shows median effective tax rates by location. The median effective tax rate
for all properties was 1.38 percent. Effective tax rates were highest in the Northeast, followed by
the Midwest, South and West. Generally, rates were highest in central cities and lowest outside
metropolitan areas. It is interesting to note, however, that this pattern did not hold true for the
West and Midwest, where effective tax rates were highest in the suburbs. As shown in figure
3.1, the highest median effective tax rates were in Northeast central cities, followed by Northeast
suburbs and central cities in the Midwest. The lowest effective tax rates were outside
metropolitan areas in the West and South. The third lowest tax rates were in Western central
cities. The greatest variation within a region was in the Northeast, and the smallest was in the
West.
Even after excluding properties with effective tax rates greater than 7.5 percent, 10 percent of the
remaining properties had effective tax rates greater than 3.5 percent. Generally, property tax
rates in the United States are set lower than 3 percent of assessed value, which makes these high
effective tax rates puzzling. Furthermore, property taxes are based on assessed values, which are
likely to be lower than market values. This should result in even lower effective tax rates. By
definition, an excessively high effective tax rate can result from either an unusually high reported
tax payment, or an unusually low reported property value. Since tax payments are recorded for
accounting purposes, it seems likely that these high effective tax rates result from erroneous
estimations of property value. Table 3.2 shows differences between properties with effective tax
rates above and below 3.5 percent. As expected, properties with high calculated effective tax
rates had a significantly lower median per-unit value ($25,000, as opposed to $35,000 for other
properties). Consistent with this, they also had lower rents and higher operating costs. These
properties were more likely to report postponed maintenance and cash flow problems. These
properties also tended to be older and larger, with fewer amenities. Nearly two-thirds were
36 52 properties had effective tax rates over 7.5%.
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Table 3.2: Comparison of Properties With Higher and Lower Effective Property Tax Rates
Median Amounts
TN more TN less
than 3.5% than 3.5%
Tax payment per unit 1,026 444
Value per unit 25,000 35,000
Gross rent per unit 4,056 4,425
Operating expense per unit 3,010 2,229
Net income per unit 1,311 2,044
Percent of Properties
TN more TN less
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built before 1960, and almost one-fourth had between 10 and 24 units.
Interestingly, properties with higher effective tax rates were twice as likely to be owned by a
corporation, and half were located in central cities in the Northeast and Midwest. Only a quarter
of properties with tax rates less than 3.5 percent were located in these same areas.
One possible explanation for these high effective tax rates is that the properties experienced a
decline in value since their last assessment. Only 18 percent of these properties reported an
increase in property value in the previous year, compared to 30 percent of other properties.
Operating Expenses and Revenue
1117 properties reported complete information for operating expenses, property tax payments,
rental receipts, and value.3 7 Properties that received property tax abatements were also excluded
from the analysis, reducing the number of properties to 899. The following costs were included
in operating expenses:
e Advertising




* Legal and other professional fees
* Management fees
* Repairs and maintenance
* Supplies
* Utilities
* Cost of tenant referrals
* Grounds/lawn care; snow removal
* Trash collection
* Personnel/labor costs
3 A property was considered to have reported full information if the respondent filled out answers in every category.
Table 3.2: Revenues, Expenses and Values Per Unit
Operating Expenses Per Unit
Mean Median Stdev
Central City
West 2,241 1,892 2,044
South 1,892 1,745 1,328
Midwest 1,574 1,360 1,121
Northeast 2,741 2,130 2,538
Suburb
West 2,139 1,974 1,003
South 1,703 1,475 1,056
Midwest 2,111 1,995 1,212
Northeast 2,425 1,907 1,914
Outside Metro Area
West 1,464 1,343 936
South 1,163 1,195 788
Midwest 1,258 1,110 885
Northeast 1,558 1,308 1,098
Gross Rental Income Per Unit
Mean Median Stdev
Central City
West 5,984 5,402 5,468
South 4,189 4,008 1,973
Midwest 4,229 4,111 2,511
Northeast 5,001 4,260 3,057
Suburb
West 6,689 5,580 9,175
South 4,421 4,505 2,061
Midwest 4,723 4,565 2,110
Northeast 12,102 5,833 55,716
Outside Metro Area
West 3,567 3,607 1,564
South 2,508 2,435 1,370
Midwest 4,229 4,111 2,511
Northeast 4,312 4,286 1,763_
Net Rental Income Per Unit
Mean Median Stdev
Central City
West 3,172 3,161 4,566
South 1,801 1,900 2,236
Midwest 2,052 1,743 2,295
Northeast 1,110 1,328 2,953
Suburb
West 3,027 2,867 2,829
South 2,327 2,301 1,712
Midwest 1,793 2,053 2,065
Northeast 2,057 2,288 3,163
Outside Metro Area
West 1,800 1,946 1,291
South 1,119 1,311 1,250
Midwest 1,788 1,500 1,447
Northeast 2,206 1,850 1,683
Property Tax Payments Per Unit
Mean Median Stdev
Central City
West 571 349 1,026
South 496 350 576
Midwest 599 500 466
Northeast 961 790 634
Suburb
West 490 395 324
South 391 399 265
Midwest 818 650 585
Northeast 1,183 965 901
Outside Metro Area
West 303 278 158
South 226 188 141
Midwest 506 417 405
Northeast 548 463 344
Note that operating costs do not include real estate taxes, mortgage or interest payments,
ground rent, or mortgage insurance. Table 3.3 and figure 3.3 show median operating
costs per unit, as well as gross and net rents and real estate tax payments. Median
operating expense per unit for all properties is $1692. Operating costs range from
$1163 in non-metropolitan areas in the South to $2740 in Northeastern central cities. In
the Northeast and South operating cost is highest in central cities, while in the West and
Midwest operating costs are highest in suburbs. In all regions, operating costs are
consistently lower outside metropolitan areas.
Figure 3.2: Revenues, Expenses, and Values Per Unit
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The median rental income for all properties is $4403. The highest rental receipts per unit
are in suburbs in the Northeast ($5833), followed closely by western suburbs ($5580) and
western central cities ($5401). Like operating costs, the lowest rents are in rural parts of
the South. Across all regions, rental receipts are highest in suburbs, followed by central
cities and rural areas. However, in western central cities, median gross rents are nearly as
high as in the suburbs. In the other regions, central city median rents are very similar,
hovering around $4000 per unit, well below rents in the suburbs.
Tax payments follow a consistent pattern: highest in the suburbs, followed by central
cities, then rural areas. The median tax payment per unit for all properties is $475, but
ranges from $188 in the rural South to $964 in Northeastern suburbs. Median real estate
taxes per unit are lower in the South and West, and higher in the Northeast and Midwest.
Note that while median tax payments are highest in suburbs, median effective tax rates
are highest in central cities. Because property values tend to be higher in suburbs, a
lower effective tax rate can result in a higher tax payment.
Net rent (after tax) was calculated as:
NR = R-C-T
where NR = net rent per unit, R = total rental receipts per unit, and C = operating cost per
unit. This definition of net rent represents the net income available to the owner after
paying property expenses, but before the cost of financing and income taxes. Overall,
there is less variation in net rents than gross rents across locations, because places with
higher gross rents generally also have higher operating costs. Median net income by
location is shown in table 3.3, above. Generally, net income is higher in the West, with
the highest net income in western central cities ($3172 per unit). In the South, Midwest,
and Northeast, the highest net rents are in suburbs. The lowest net rents are in the South
outside metropolitan areas and in Northeastern central cities. It is interesting to note that
gross rents vary considerably between these two types of locations, with much higher
rents in Northeastern central cities. However, the combination of higher operating costs
and taxes appears, on average, to bring net income down significantly. The Northeast is
the only region where net rents in the central city are lower than they are outside the
metropolitan area.
Capitalization Rates
The capitalization rate was Figure 3.3: Median NR/V By Location
calculated as: 
_0_ _
i = NR/V 8%
* Northeast
where i = the capitalization 6% 0 Midwest
rate, NR = net rental receipts 4% 0 South
38 E]West
and V = property value. 2%
The median capitalization rate 0%
forallproertes as %.Central City Suburb Outside MAfor all properties was 7%.
While this is a relatively low
rate (even after taxes), it (NRN >0)
reflects the presence of
negative net rent figures. 8%
Sixteen percent of all M Northeast6%- -U Midwest
properties had negative net 0 South
rental income during 1995. 2%
Rates varied widely across 0%
Central City Suburb Outside MA
properties. As shown in
figure 3.3, capitalization rates
were highest in the South and lowest in the West. Median capitalization rates varied more
between regions than within them. Central cities had the greatest variation in rates,
ranging from 3 percent in the Northeast to over 8 percent in the South. The highest
median capitalization rate was in Southern suburbs, followed by Southern central cities
and Midwestern central cities. The lowest median rates were in Northeast central cities,
Northeast suburbs, and Western rural areas. Properties outside metropolitan areas had the
smallest variation in capitalization rates, ranging between 6 and 7 percent.
38 Net rental receipts are residential only, despite the fact that some properties include commercial units.
Considering only properties with positive net rent figures (84 percent), the distribution of
capitalization rates is somewhat changed. As shown in figure 3.4, this reduces the
variation between median capitalization rates to between 6 and 9.5 percent. Rates still
vary more between regions than within them. The highest capitalization rates are still in
Southern cities and suburbs, but the third highest rates are in Midwest rural areas. The
lowest rates are in Northeastern suburbs, followed by Western rural and suburban areas.
Generally, capitalization rates are lowest in the West, where there are higher net rents,
but even higher property values. The median capitalization rate for properties in
Northeastern central cities is much higher when the analysis is restricted to properties
with positive net rent figures, which implies that properties in the Northeast are more
likely to have financial difficulties.
Looking at capitalization rates across different sizes of buildings, properties with less
than five units had lower rates, with lower standard deviations. Of the 899 properties,
nearly half (48 percent) had less than five units. Smaller properties were more likely to
have negative net rents: 20 percent of properties with less than five units had net rents of
zero or less, as opposed to 8 percent for other properties. However, this number may be
skewed because smaller properties are more likely to be owner occupied. Some resident
owners may not have included the cost of their own rent in reported rental receipts.
Descriptive Regressions
To further explore the distribution of expenses, revenues, values and tax rates,
regressions were run using a variety of structural, tenant, ownership and management
attributes as independent variables. The variables are based on property-level
information. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in table 3.3. The
same variables are used to estimate property tax incidence in the following chapter. In
addition to location, the regressions include a variety of other property characteristics:
Age of Property
Age of property should have an impact on value, rents and operating costs. The impact
of age on value and rents depends on the nature of the property and the tastes of
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in Regressions
N Percent N Percent
All Properties 802 100% Property Characteristics
Competes with private housing 575 72%
Location Competes with public housing 146 18%
Northeast central city 118 15% Property value increase since previous year 231 29%
Northeast suburb 69 9% Serious cash flow problems 52 6%
Northeast outside metro area 26 3% Rent control 63 8%
Midwest central city 100 12% Section 8 tenants at property 98 12%
Midwest suburb 76 9%
Midwest outside metro area 52 6% Ownership Type
South central city 83 10% Individual/Husband and Wife 543 68%
South suburb 53 7% Partnership 157 20%
South outside metro area 35 4% Corporation 42 5%
West central city 107 13% Other 60 7%
West suburb 69 9%
West outside metro area 14 2% Tenant Characteristics
Mainly low-income 247 31%
Year Built Mainly mid-income 280 35%
Before 1960 373 47% Other/don't know 275 34%
1960-69 107 13%
1970-79 172 21% Management Characteristics
1980-89 107 13% Maintenance usually postponed 34 4%
1990 on 43 5% Resident Manager 191 24%
Non-Resident Manager 602 75%
Number of Units
2 to 5 375 47% Amenities
6 to 10 101 13% Air conditioning 308 38%
11 to 24 99 12% Covered parking 209 26%
25 to 49 45 6% Uncovered parking 539 67%
50 to 100 45 6% Social events 73 9%
100 or more 137 17% Electronic security system for unit 48 6%
Security system for property 129 16%
Average Number of Units Per Building Laundry in unit 87 11%
2 units 281 35% Elevator 39 5%
3-9 units 237 30% Sprinkler system 70 9%
10 or more units 284 35%
Properties were excluded for the following reasons: effective tax rate less than .jo or greater than '4%; annual reI
per unit less than $200; annual operating cost per unit less than $100; reported net rent greater than value.
I-.
renters. If renters value the characteristics of older buildings (character, uniqueness),
then older buildings can command higher rents. Newer properties may have lower
operating expenses and maintenance costs.
Units
The total number of units at a property may have an effect on operating expenses and
rents. As discussed in the previous chapter, smaller properties are more likely to be
owner-occupied and owned by individual owners. Theoretically, under certain
circumstances, larger properties may be able to achieve economies of scale, reducing per
unit operating expenses.
The variables for average number of units per building are included in regressions as an
attempted proxy for density. In the POMS, property size is distinguished only by number
of units: the number of floors per building was not recorded. For survey purposes, a
property was defined as all buildings under the same deed. Hence, a large property may
consist of one high-rise apartment building, or many smaller buildings. Density variables
were created by dividing the total number of units at each property by the total number of
buildings. While this may not equal the actual number of units per building (since there
may be different size buildings at a property), it should give a rough estimate of density.
Notably, over one-third of properties averaged two units per building. Other things being
equal, higher density is expected to lead to lower per unit rents and values.
Property and Market Characteristics
Competition for tenants depends on the local rental market. Variables were included for
properties whose owners listed their main competition as either privately owned or public
housing. Properties in these categories may have commonalities in terms of property
characteristics, revenues and expenses. Another variable was included for properties
whose owners reported that their property value increased during the previous year. For
properties whose value increased, we would expect the effective tax rate to be lower,
since value is the denominator in the tax rate equation (T/V). A variable was also
included for properties that reported serious cash flow problems. These distressed
properties should, on average, have lower rents and/or higher operating costs. Properties
with rent control are more likely to be in urban areas, and a high percentage are likely in
New York City. Because of this, rent controlled properties are expected to have higher
rents and effective tax rates. The presence of Section 8 units should also have an impact
on profitability, since these properties receive subsidies from the federal government.
Ownership Type
Variables for ownership type were included in regressions because ownership may
influence revenues, expenses, and maintenance. Individual owners, in particular, may
manage their properties differently. For instance, individual owners are more likely to
live at their property. Several studies have shown that there is a relationship between
housing upkeep and owner occupancy, that owner-occupied units are more likely to be
better maintained.39 Other types of owners may be more profit-driven.
Tenant Characteristics
Quality of apartments should be strongly related to tenant incomes. There is ample
empirical evidence that people with higher incomes are willing to pay higher rents.40
Management Characteristics
Management characteristics were included in regressions because property management
is associated with profitability and quality of services. The extent to which maintenance
is postponed should have a significant impact on operating costs in the short term, and on
value over the long term.
Amenities
The level of amenities at a property is expected to have an impact on the desirability of
apartments, hence rents. Depending on the amenity, they may also influence operating
costs. Information about unit amenities is limited in the POMS data. Regressions
included variables for laundry, air conditioning, parking, and presence of a security
39 Carroll and Yinger, op. cit., 305.
40 For example, see DiPasquale and Wheaton, op. cit., 219.
system for the unit or property. Some of the amenities were included because they may
serve as a proxy for different property types. Presence of an automatic sprinkler system
(for fire suppression) was included as a proxy for more modem buildings. A variable for
social events was included in regressions with the idea that properties offering this
amenity are most likely senior housing. These properties should have distinct patterns of
operating costs and revenues. The elevator variable was included as another way to
control for density of units.
Regression Results
The variables discussed above were used as the independent variables in regressions,
with the effective tax rate (T/V), tax payment per unit (T), gross rental receipts per unit
(R), operating costs per unit (C), and value per unit (V) as dependent variables. For ease
of interpretation, rent, value and operating costs were converted to log form. Although
this lowers the adjusted R square for the regressions slightly, it should not distort the
results. Note that the following variables were excluded as base cases: Northeast central
city, built before 1960, 2 to 5 units at property, average of 2 buildings at property, owner
is an individual, tenants are mainly middle-income, and manager is not a resident. The
complete regression outputs are included in tables 3.4 through 3.8 at the end of this
chapter. For ease of interpretation, a summary of regression results is shown in table 3.4.
The table shows the sign of each coefficient having a t-statistic with an absolute value
greater than 1.5. Location variables were excluded from the table, but were generally
statistically significant and negative (see tables 3.5 - 3.9 at end of chapter).
Fundamentally, tax rates should vary according to jurisdiction, not property
characteristics. However, the regression with tax rate as the dependent variable can
provide clues about the characteristics of properties that are located in areas with higher
or lower tax rates. Because jurisdiction is the most important factor influencing tax rates,
many of the variables in this regression are not significant.
4 Location is discussed extensively earlier in the chapter. Because all coefficients on location variables are
relative to the base case, Northeast central city, their signs are not particularly instructive.
Table 3.4 Summary of Descriptive
Regression Results
"+I1 and "-" represent a positive or negative coefficient
having a t-statistic with an absolute value greater than
1.5.
___________________________Dependent Variables
Independent Variables TN T V R IC
Built 196010o69 1+
Built 197010o79 + + +
Built 198010o89 + + + -
Built 1990 on + + + -
5 to 9 units
1010o24 units + - - -
25 to 49 units
50 to 99 units
100 or more units + - -
3 to 9 units per building- -
10 or more units per building__- -
Competes with private housing- - - - -
Competes with public housing- -
Property value increased in previous year +
Serious cash flow problems +
Rent control + + + +
Section 8 units
Owner is a partnership + + + +
Owner is a corporation+ + +
Other type of owner + +





Covre prkng+ + +
Ucovered parking+ - -
Social events + + +
Security system for unit + + +
Laundry in unit +
Elevator +
Automatic sprinkler system - -
Note: location variables are not included in the table; dependent
variables are per unit values
Notably, there were also less significant variables in the regression predicting operating
costs. This indicates that the factors influencing operating costs may be less
straightforward than those for rents and values.
It is instructive to compare the regression with tax payment per unit as the dependent
variable to the regression using effective tax rates. In the regression with tax payments,
age of building, number of units, and units per building were all significant variables.
The coefficients for variables in the tax payment regression are always the same sign as
those for value. This makes sense because properties with higher values have higher tax
payments. Broadly, per unit property values impact tax payments more than the tax rate.
Age of Building
As discussed above, effective tax rates tend to be lower in the West and outside of central
cities. Properties are also expected to be newer in these areas. Hence, it is surprising that
the regressions showed no significant relationship between age of building and effective
tax rates. However, real tax payments, rents and values are higher for newer buildings.
As expected, newer properties tend to have lower operating costs as well. For properties
built since 1980, operating costs are significantly lower.
Units
Effective tax rates do not vary significantly with number of units or density. Like age of
building, the density variable is somewhat surprising, since we would expect higher
densities in central cities, where tax rates are generally higher. It may be that more
comprehensive density variables would be required to pick up these differences in
effective tax rates. Alternatively, the effect may be diluted by low effective tax rates for
properties in western central cities.
Properties with more units tend to have lower values and lower tax payments relative to
smaller properties. The density variables also suggest that larger properties have lower
per unit values. Rent per unit is lower in properties with 10 to 49 units, but is not
significantly lower for properties with 50 or more units. This may reflect the fact that
high-income renters tend to live in larger buildings (as discussed in Chapter 2). The
regressions showed no significant relationship between operating costs and density or
number of units, providing no evidence for economies of scale for larger rental
properties.
Property and Market Characteristics
Properties that compete with public housing had lower values, hence lower tax payments.
Competition with private housing was not a significant variable in any of the regressions.
Properties experiencing serious cash flow problems had higher operating costs and lower
values. Surprisingly, properties that listed public housing as their main competition did
not have significantly lower rents. However, presence of Section 8 tenants appears to
have a negative influence on rents.
Properties with values that increased in the previous year had lower effective tax rates,
which is understandable, since value is the denominator in the equation for tax rates, TN.
Because properties are not re-assessed every year, an increase in property value reduces
the effective tax rate paid on the property.
Properties restricted by rent control regulations tended to have higher effective tax rates.
This makes sense, given that rent control regulations are usually in central cities.
Properties constrained by rent control regulations also had higher tax payments, value,
rent, and operating costs per unit. This is consistent with the idea that the rent control
variable serves as a proxy for properties located in New York City.
Ownership Type
Notably, the ownership variables are significant, particularly in the regressions with
rental receipts and operating costs per unit. The base case is individual ownership, and
all significant variables have positive coefficients. Apparently, properties owned by
individuals are less valuable, and have lower rents and operating costs on a per unit basis.
As hypothesized, it may be that individual owners are less profit-driven than partnerships
or corporations. However, as mentioned previously, per unit rent and operating costs for
properties owned by individuals may be skewed due to owner occupancy. Individuals are
also more likely to own smaller properties with fewer amenities, which would help to
explain lower operating costs. However, note that amenities in the regression with
operating costs as the dependent variable are not statistically significant. Surprisingly,
property characteristics such as air conditioning, laundry, and presence of a security
system do not show a significant relationship to operating costs.
Tenant Characteristics
Properties with low income tenants tend to have higher effective tax rates, perhaps
because cities and towns with a higher number of low income residents generally need to
provide higher levels of services, which requires more tax revenue. Despite the fact that
these properties are typically in areas with higher tax rates, this does not translate into
higher actual tax payments. Rent and value per unit are also lower for properties with
low-income tenants.
Management Characteristics
At first, it seems somewhat counter-intuitive that properties where most maintenance is
postponed tended to have higher values. However, owners of these properties may have
been increasing current profits by reducing current operating expenses. If the estimation
of property value is based on current net operating income, deferred maintenance leads to
lower operating costs, hence higher value. However, theoretically, this lack of
maintenance should reduce value in the long run.
The variable for resident manager at the property was not significant in most of the
regressions, but there is a positive relationship between on-site management and property
value.
Amenities
The regressions suggest some interesting connections between amenities and effective tax
rates. Provision of either covered or uncovered parking is positively related to higher
effective tax rates. Properties with covered parking also had higher rents, suggesting
either that renters pay extra to park indoors, or that expensive apartments provide covered
parking. For properties with uncovered parking, there is no statistically significant
relationship with per unit rent. However, these properties tend to have lower values.
These may be more modest suburban or rural apartments.
Interestingly, properties with air conditioning and automatic sprinkler systems tend to
have lower effective tax rates. Properties with air conditioning also had lower tax
payments and rents. This may be because many of these properties are in the South.
Meanwhile, properties equipped with an automatic sprinkler system had higher per-unit
values and rents, which supports the idea that these are generally newer buildings.
A variable for social events was included in regressions with the idea that it could serve
as a proxy for senior housing or assisted living facilities. The unique nature of this type
of housing means that their operating costs and revenues might be dissimilar from other
types of rental housing. The regression results are consistent with this view. Per unit
rents operating costs are higher at properties that offer social events for tenants. Per unit
values are also higher, which may reflect growing demand for this type of rental housing.
The relationship between the variables for security systems and several of the dependent
variables is also worthy of note. Although the presence of a security system for the entire
property was expected to be related to higher property values and rents, this was not so.
However, the provision of security systems for individual units is positively related to
higher tax payments, values and costs. These may be more modem buildings. Properties
with elevators also charged higher rents.
Generally, properties with more amenities charge higher rents and have higher per-unit
values. With the exception of social events, none of the amenities were significant
predictors of operating costs. This indicates (unsurprisingly) that the cost of amenities
are passed through to renters. Higher values for properties with more amenities suggest
that renters may be willing to pay a premium for some types of housing services.
Chapter 4 uses these same variables in an attempt to estimate the incidence of the
property tax.
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Table 3.4: Regression With Effective Tax
Rate as the Dependent Variable
B Std. Error t
(Constant) 0.019 0.001 18.320
Northeast suburb -0.002 0.001 -1.780
Northeast rural -0.007 0.002 -3.856
Midwest central city -0.002 0.001 -1.520
Midwest suburb -0.001 0.001 -0.600
Midwest rural -0.004 0.001 -2.513
South central city -0.005 0.001 -3.695
South suburb -0.007 0.001 -4.555
South rural -0.009 0.002 -5.202
West central city -0.013 0.001 -10.564
West suburb -0.013 0.001 -9.682
West rural -0.009 0.002 -3.862
Built 1960 to 69 -0.001 0.001 -0.560
Built 1970 to 79 0.001 0.001 0.611
Built 1980 to 89 0.000 0.001 0.204
Built 1990 on 0.001 0.001 0.841
5 to 9 units 0.001 0.001 0.524
10 to 24 units 0.002 0.001 1.664
25 to 49 units 0.001 0.002 0.954
50 to 99 units 0.002 0.002 1.178
100 or more units 0.002 0.001 1.713
3 to 9 units per building 0.000 0.001 -0.180
10 or more units per building 0.000 0.001 0.254
Competes with private housing 0.001 0.001 1.245
Competes with public housing 0.000 0.001 0.572
Property value increase -0.002 0.001 -2.643
Serious cash flow problems 0.001 0.001 0.767
Rent control 0.002 0.001 1.407
Section 8 units 0.000 0.001 0.442
Owner is a partnership 0.000 0.001 0.015
Owner is a corporation -0.001 0.001 -1.023
Other owner -0.001 0.001 -0.677
Low-income tenants 0.002 0.001 2.937
Tenants other/don't know 0.000 0.001 0.402
Maintenance postponed -0.001 0.001 -0.985
Resident Manager 0.000 0.001 0.217
Air conditioning -0.002 0.001 -2.950
Covered parking 0.003 0.001 4.064
Uncovered parking 0.001 0.001 1.949
Social events -0.001 0.001 -0.746
Security system for unit 0.000 0.001 -0.172
Security system for property 0.000 0.001 -0.053
Laundry in unit 0.000 0.001 -0.475
Elevator 0.001 0.002 0.682
Automatic sprinkler system -0.002 0.001 -1.819
Adjusted R square: .25
Table 3.5: Regression With
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Table 3.6: Regression With Per Unit Value
as the Dependent Variable
B Std. Error t
(Constant) 10.903 0.072 150.556
Northeast suburb 0.243 0.086 2.810
Northeast rural -0.116 0.127 -0.913
Midwest central city -0.377 0.080 -4.693
Midwest suburb -0.263 0.090 -2.921
Midwest rural -0.455 0.099 -4.593
South central city -0.392 0.090 -4.363
South suburb -0.402 0.103 -3.913
South rural -0.690 0.115 -5.985
West central city 0.161 0.084 1.928
West suburb 0.202 0.097 2.084
West rural -0.253 0.162 -1.558
Built 1960 to 69 0.129 0.068 1.908
Built 1970 to 79 0.135 0.062 2.177
Built 1980 to 89 0.306 0.071 4.291
Built 1990 on 0.186 0.094 1.973
5 to 9 units -0.303 0.070 -4.304
10 to 24 units -0.399 0.080 -4.988
25 to 49 units -0.497 0.106 -4.690
50 to 99 units -0.607 0.118 -5.128
100 or more units -0.658 0.102 -6.471
3 to 9 units per building -0.112 0.058 -1.936
10 or more units per building -0.163 0.062 -2.617
Competes with private housing -0.028 0.046 -0.619
Competes with public housing -0.160 0.054 -2.965
Property value increase 0.120 0.046 2.618
Serious cash flow problems -0.192 0.082 -2.342
Rent control 0.142 0.084 1.694
Section 8 units 0.072 0.067 1.078
Owner is a partnership 0.281 0.063 4.426
Owner is a corporation 0.231 0.097 2.387
Other owner 0.114 0.081 1.409
Low-income tenants -0.489 0.053 -9.227
Tenants other/don't know -0.109 0.048 -2.251
Maintenance postponed 0.217 0.100 2.177
Resident Manager 0.090 0.058 1.549
Air conditioning 0.008 0.049 0.165
Covered parking 0.068 0.053 1.284
Uncovered parking -0.119 0.050 -2.391
Social events 0.197 0.087 2.276
Security system for unit 0.245 0.088 2.783
Security system for property -0.071 0.062 -1.150
Laundry in unit 0.088 0.065 1.346
Elevator 0.134 0.108 1.250
Automatic sprinkler system 0.170 0.076 2.219
Adjusted R Square: .41
Note: dependent variable was converted to log form.
Table 3.7: Regression With Per Unit
Rental Receipts as the Dependent Variable
B Std. Error t
(Constant) 8.284 0.075 109.842
Northeast suburb 0.207 0.090 2.299
Northeast rural 0.031 0.132 0.235
Midwest central city -0.134 0.084 -1.606
Midwest suburb -0.150 0.094 -1.602
Midwest rural -0.252 0.103 -2.442
South central city -0.169 0.093 -1.803
South suburb -0.099 0.107 -0.925
South rural -0.473 0.120 -3.937
West central city 0.087 0.087 1.003
West suburb 0.092 0.101 0.915
West rural -0.058 0.169 -0.343
Built 1960 to 69 0.102 0.070 1.451
Built 1970 to 79 0.184 0.065 2.845
Built 1980 to 89 0.239 0.074 3.213
Built 1990 on 0.153 0.098 1.563
5 to 9 units -0.069 0.073 -0.934
10 to 24 units -0.199 0.083 -2.387
25 to 49 units -0.182 0.110 -1.651
50 to 99 units -0.147 0.123 -1.196
100 or more units -0.138 0.106 -1.304
3 to 9 units per building 0.008 0.060 0.138
10 or more units per building 0.045 0.065 0.685
Competes with private housing 0.064 0.048 1.347
Competes with public housing -0.063 0.056 -1.122
Property value increase 0.042 0.048 0.881
Serious cash flow problems -0.013 0.086 -0.157
Rent control 0.309 0.087 3.543
Section 8 units -0.121 0.070 -1.730
Owner is a partnership 0.173 0.066 2.628
Owner is a corporation 0.210 0.101 2.079
Other owner 0.130 0.084 1.546
Low-income tenants -0.297 0.055 -5.377
Tenants other/don't know -0.067 0.050 -1.328
Maintenance postponed -0.007 0.104 -0.063
Resident Manager 0.030 0.061 0.488
Air conditioning -0.083 0.052 -1.614
Covered parking 0.150 0.055 2.702
Uncovered parking 0.009 0.052 0.171
Social events 0.172 0.090 1.912
Security system for unit 0.144 0.092 1.574
Security system for property 0.004 0.064 0.061
Laundry in unit -0.062 0.068 -0.905
Elevator 0.274 0.112 2.447
Automatic sprinkler system 0.137 0.080 1.719
Adjusted R Square: .21
Note: dependent variable was converted to log form.
Table 3.8: Regression With Operating Expense
as the Dependent Variable
B Std. Error t
(Constant) 7.470 0.093 80.173
Northeast suburb 0.072 0.111 0.651
Northeast rural -0.444 0.163 -2.723
Midwest central city -0.395 0.103 -3.813
Midwest suburb -0.197 0.116 -1.698
Midwest rural -0.583 0.127 -4.576
South central city -0.456 0.116 -3.944
South suburb -0.390 0.132 -2.944
South rural -0.713 0.148 -4.807
West central city -0.154 0.108 -1.434
West suburb -0.102 0.125 -0.814
West rural -0.280 0.209 -1.340
Built 1960 to 69 0.021 0.087 0.239
Built 1970 to 79 -0.027 0.080 -0.343
Built 1980 to 89 -0.240 0.092 -2.616
Built 1990 on -0.197 0.121 -1.628
5 to 9 units 0.015 0.091 0.161
10 to 24 units 0.001 0.103 0.011
25 to 49 units 0.067 0.136 0.493
50 to 99 units 0.031 0.152 0.205
100 or more units 0.098 0.131 0.749
3 to 9 units per building 0.055 0.074 0.741
10 or more units per building 0.032 0.080 0.394
Competes with private housing 0.013 0.059 0.222
Competes with public housing -0.048 0.069 -0.687
Property value increase -0.042 0.059 -0.717
Serious cash flow problems 0.181 0.106 1.713
Rent control 0.228 0.108 2.112
Section 8 units 0.096 0.086 1.112
Owner is a partnership 0.271 0.082 3.325
Owner is a corporation 0.309 0.125 2.476
Other owner 0.231 0.104 2.213
Low-income tenants -0.056 0.068 -0.828
Tenants other/don't know -0.004 0.062 -0.065
Maintenance postponed -0.044 0.128 -0.342
Resident Manager 0.081 0.075 1.078
Air conditioning 0.051 0.064 0.808
Covered parking 0.029 0.068 0.428
Uncovered parking -0.052 0.064 -0.804
Social events 0.265 0.111 2.382
Security system for unit 0.090 0.113 0.800
Security system for property 0.077 0.080 0.969
Laundry in unit -0.047 0.084 -0.558
Elevator 0.044 0.138 0.319
Automatic sprinkler system 0.084 0.098 0.858
Adjusted R Square: .18
Note: dependent variable was converted to log form.
Chapter 4: Analysis of Property Tax Incidence Using the POMS Data
This chapter uses the variables discussed in chapter 3 in an attempt to estimate the
incidence of the property tax. After an explanation of the basic theoretical model, two
regression procedures are used to estimate the incidence of the tax. Both are
unsuccessful. However, they do provide useful clues about the limitations of the POMS
data. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the information that would be
necessary to estimate the incidence of the tax.
As explained in Chapter 1, most empirical studies of property tax incidence focus on
differences in tax rates between jurisdictions, in order to determine the impact of those
differences on rents and/or property values. Analysis of property tax incidence using the
POMS data necessitates unconventional methods, due to the limited geographic
information in the data set. Most studies of property tax incidence use a hedonic equation
which includes either the tax rate, or an effective tax rate for the jurisdiction. In this
analysis, because effective tax rates are by property, the tax rate is an endogenous
variable.
Estimating the incidence of the tax requires analysis of the relationship between property
values, rents, and taxes, all of which are interdependent. These variables can be defined
through a series of simultaneous equations. First, rents depend on numerous factors,
including location, neighborhood characteristics, building quality, amenities, and other
property characteristics that make an apartment more or less desirable to renters. If
apartment owners are able to pass on a portion of their property taxes in the form of
higher rents, then rents also include a fraction of the total tax payment. The equation for
rental receipts can be expressed as:
(1) R=a+$X+yT
where R is gross rental receipts, X is the combined effect of all other rent determining
variables (quality, size, attractiveness of the neighborhood and other characteristics), T is
the tax payment, and y is the percent of tax payments passed on to renters in the form of
higher rents.
Typically, property value is estimated using net operating income and a capitalization
rate:
(2) V = [R-C-T]/i
where C is operating expenses and i is the capitalization rate. Here, net operating income
is defined as rent minus expenses, including taxes. Net income is divided by a
capitalization rate to obtain property value. With higher rents or lower operating costs,
property value increases. How a change in the tax payment affects value depends on the
incidence of the tax: if the incidence of the tax lies with renters, a change in the tax
payment should ultimately have no impact on property value.
Third, tax payments are determined by the tax rate and property value:
(3) T = tV
where T is the property tax payment, t is the tax rate, and V is property value. As shown
above, property value is a function of rents, costs, and taxes. Thus, tax helps to
determine value, and value determines the tax. As mentioned in Chapter 1, in
jurisdictions with high tax rates, this can lead to a vicious cycle of declining values and
tax payments, particularly if the taxing entity relies on the property tax as a major source
of revenue.
Estimations of Property Tax Incidence
Two statistical procedures were used to estimate property tax incidence using the POMS
data. The first is a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, and the second is a
two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Properties with an effective tax rate greater
than 3.5% were excluded from the analysis. Properties with less than 5 units were also
removed. Smaller properties are different from larger properties in a number of ways,
including the fact that they are more likely to be owner occupied. As explained in
chapter 3, the presence of owner occupied units, particularly in small properties, may
distort the relationship between rental receipts and operating costs. Analysis was also
restricted to the Midwest and Northeast regions. Again, as shown in the previous
chapter, there are significant differences in effective tax rates and multifamily property
characteristics among different census regions, with the South and West distinguished by
newer properties with more units, as well as lower effective property tax rates. Properties
from both the Northeast and Midwest regions were included in order to maintain a
legitimate number of observations (204).
All variables are based on property level information, but rents, operating costs, tax
payments, and property values were divided by the number of units in the property to
control for scale.43 Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for these variables.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Std.
Minimum Maximum Mean Deviation
TN 0.004 0.039 0.021 0.009
T (Tax Payment) 50 3485 645 493
R (Gross Rent) 415 23747 4967 2892
C (Operating Costs) 299 22701 2339 2148
C + T (Operating Costs Plus Taxes) 470 23192 2984 2337
R-C-T (Net Rental Income) -8927 8147 1983 2139
V (Value) 2500 187500 31924 19834
All Values are Per Unit
N = 205
Table 4.2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included as explanatory "X"
variables in the regressions. In addition to location, age of building, and number of units,
several other variables were included because they are expected to influence rent and
operating costs, hence, value and tax payments. These are the same variables discussed
in Chapter 3. In the regressions, the following variables are omitted as base cases:
42 Also excluded were properties with annual operating costs less than $100, gross rents less than $200.
43 It would have been preferable to use square footage, but this information was not available as a part of
the survey data.
Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics for
included in Regressions
Property Characteristics ("X" Variables)
N Percent N Percent
All Properties 205 100% Property Characteristics
Competes with private housing 145 71%
Location Competes with public housing 43 21%
Northeast central city 51 25% Property value increase since previous year 63 31%
Northeast suburb 30 15% Serious cash flow problems 17 8%
Northeast rural 13 6% Rent control 32 16%
Midwest central city 46 22% Section 8 tenants at property 37 18%
Midwest suburb 43 21%
Midwest rural 22 11% Ownership Type
Individual/husband and wife 103 50%
Year Built Partnership 70 34%
Before 1960 91 44% Corporation 14 7%
1960 to 69 24 12% Other 18 9%
1970 to 79 61 30%
1980 to 89 15 7% Tenant Characteristics
1990 on 14 7% Mostly low income 60 29%
Mostly middle income 67 33%
Number of Units at Property Other/don't know 78 38%
5 to 9 units 66 32%
10 to 24 units 47 23% Amenities
25 to 49 units 21 10% Air conditioning 74 36%
50 to 99 units 25 12% Covered parking 19 9%
100 or more units 46 22% Uncovered parking 140 68%
Social events 27 13%
Average Number of Units Per Building Electronic security system for unit 20 10%
2 units 15 7% Security system for property 54 26%
3 to 9 units 75 37% Laundry in unit 15 7%
10 or more units 115 56% Elevator 27 13%
Automatic sprinkler system 34 17%
Management Characteristics
Mantenance usually postponed 7 3%
Resident manager 62 30%
Non-resident manager 142 69%
Northeast central city; built before 1960; 5 to 9 units; 2 units per building; owner is an
individual; tenants mainly middle income; and manager is not a resident. Also, note that
there were no properties in this subset of data whose owners listed their tenants as mainly
high-income.
Equation 1 cannot be used to estimate the incidence because T is an endogenous variable.
Substituting equation 2 into equation 3 results in:
(4) T = a[R-C]
where D = t/(i+t). Assuming the capitalization rate ranges between 7 and 12 percent, and
tax rates vary from approximately 1 to 3 percent, the value of a should be between 0.08
and 0.21. Substituting equation 4 into the first equation,
R = a + $X + yD[R-C], or
(5) R = [(a + PX) - yaC]/(1-ya).
This equation was estimated using OLS, with rent per unit as the dependent variable.
The independent variables included costs per unit, as well as the variables for property
characteristics discussed above (the "X" variables). The regression output is shown in
table 4.3. The incidence of the tax, y, is included in the coefficient on operating costs,
-ya/(l-ya). According to the regression, the value of the coefficient is .787. Across a
broad range of assumptions about the value of D, (.08-.2 1), the value of y is always
negative (-20 to -48), with a high absolute value. This result makes no sense, given that
the expected value of the coefficient is between 0 (none of the tax is passed forward to
renters) and 1 (all of the tax is passed forward to renters).
Another way to estimate the incidence of the tax is using a two-stage least squares
regression. Substituting equation 3 into equation 1 yields:
(6) R = a + $X + ytV
Table 4.3
Dependent variable: gross rent per unit
Adjusted R square: .531
B Std. Error t
(Constant) 3018.211 766.792 3.936
Operating costs per unit 0.787 0.082 9.588
Northeast suburb 94.995 568.581 0.167
Northeast rural 466.170 782.140 0.596
Midwest central city -309.180 543.067 -0.569
Midwest suburb -439.240 608.013 -0.722
Midwest rural -375.730 662.597 -0.567
Built 1960 to 69 803.944 586.246 1.371
Built 1970 to 79 1200.133 486.004 2.469
Built 1980 to 89 2122.945 712.167 2.981
Built 1990 on 983.302 728.032 1.351
10 to 24 units 149.772 605.275 0.247
25 to 49 units 67.934 732.207 0.093
50 to 99 units -375.710 800.252 -0.469
100 or more units 24.238 747.052 0.032
Units in building between 3 and 9 41.573 613.423 0.068
Units in building 10 or more -339.478 674.420 -0.503
Competes with private housing 323.979 380.117 0.852
Competes with public housing -829.178 382.276 -2.169
Property value increased in previous year 361.935 347.746 1.041
Cash flow problems -302.401 580.661 -0.521
Rent control 1673.251 557.990 2.999
Section 8 units at property 16.454 405.747 0.041
Owner is a partnership -502.725 387.488 -1.297
Owner is a corporation -1403.406 634.264 -2.213
Other type of owner -357.593 628.406 -0.569
Low income tenants -1524.446 432.540 -3.524
Tenants other/don't know -455.551 362.732 -1.256
Maintenance postponed -1072.671 834.288 -1.286
Resident manager 926.211 348.110 2.661
Air conditioning -445.594 393.419 -1.133
Covered parking -487.030 526.400 -0.925
Uncovered parking -186.361 462.081 -0.403
Social events 665.766 575.600 1.157
Security system for property -22.551 533.969 -0.042
Security system for unit 308.045 404.263 0.762
Laundry in unit -295.709 587.102 -0.504
Elevator 1160.572 558.102 2.079
Automatic sprinkler system 428.049 441.578 0.969
Equation 4 can be rewritten as:
(6) V= TIR - icC
where il and ic should be close to i/(i+t). Equations 6 and 7 constitute a system of
simultaneous equations that are perfectly "identified," because the X variables in the rent
equation are not in the value equation, and operating costs are in the equation for value,
but not the equation for rent.
Predicted values of V (labeled VV) were estimated using operating costs as an
instrumental variable, along with the other variables for property characteristics. The
regression output is in Appendix 1.
These predicted values of V were used to estimate rents in equation 6 (R = a + $X +
ytVV). The expected coefficient for VV is between 0 and 0.03, assuming incidence
between 0 and 1, and a tax rate less than 3%. The regression output is shown in table 4.4.
The coefficient on VV, yt, is .392. Assuming the tax rate is between 1% and 3%, the
incidence of the tax (y) is between 13 and 39. Again, this coefficient is too large to be
interpreted as a meaningful result.
This same two-stage regression was attempted using the natural log of value, rents, and
operating costs, in an attempt to control for scaling in the value and rent variables:
(6a) log(R) = a + PX + ytlog(VV)
The regression output is shown in table 4.4. The coefficient for log(VV) in equation 6a is
1.114, consistent with the previous regression.
The above results reveal that the data provided in the POMS are inadequate for the
purpose of estimating tax incidence. For a regression to be meaningful, all of the
independent variables must be uncorrelated with the error term. However, there appear
Table 4.4
2SLS Linear Regression
Dependent variable: log(gross rent per unit) (logR)
Adjusted R square: .283
B Std. Error t
(Constant) -3.398 2.227 -1.526
Predicted value of value per unit (VV) 1.114 0.214 5.213
Northeast suburb -0.009 0.158 -0.060
Northeast rural 0.331 0.220 1.506
Midwest central city 0.125 0.160 0.782
Midwest suburb 0.103 0.182 0.570
Midwest rural 0.102 0.192 0.535
Built 1960 to 69 0.010 0.166 0.059
Built 1970 to 79 0.062 0.140 0.441
Built 1980 to 89 0.105 0.209 0.500
Built 1990 on -0.084 0.204 -0.413
10 to 24 units 0.058 0.169 0.344
25 to 49 units 0.193 0.204 0.946
50 to 99 units 0.240 0.228 1.056
100 or more units 0.222 0.209 1.061
Units in building between 3 and 9 0.056 0.171 0.330
Units in building 10 or more 0.218 0.196 1.109
Competes with private housing 0.059 0.106 0.560
Competes with public housing -0.027 0.110 -0.247
Property value increased in previous year -0.090 0.104 -0.859
Cash flow problems 0.426 0.174 2.446
Rent control 0.244 0.163 1.496
Section 8 units at property -0.217 0.116 -1.865
Owner is a partnership -0.160 0.110 -1.462
Owner is a corporation 0.003 0.172 0.020
Other type of owner -0.043 0.177 -0.245
Low income tenants 0.105 0.149 0.709
Tenants other/don't know 0.049 0.105 0.466
Maintenance postponed -0.358 0.253 -1.416
Resident manager 0.000 0.104 -0.002
Air conditioning -0.177 0.111 -1.587
Covered parking 0.136 0.148 0.918
Uncovered parking 0.057 0.128 0.443
Social events 0.157 0.158 0.989
Security system for property -0.040 0.149 -0.266
Security system for unit -0.090 0.113 -0.792
Laundry in unit -0.186 0.165 -1.129
Elevator 0.156 0.157 0.993
Automatic sprinkler system -0.058 0.127 -0.456
to be important variables omitted from the analysis, which are not provided in the POMS
data. Significantly, the POMS does not provide sufficient information to control for the
relative quality of units. This problem is compounded by the fact that units with higher
rents also tend to have higher operating costs, taxes and value. Table 4.8 is a correlation
matrix for the rent, tax, operating cost, and value variables (per unit) used in the analysis.
The matrix shows that all of these variables are significantly correlated with each other.
This correlation, combined with the lack of appropriate variables to explain differences in
rents, results in coefficients on value and tax that are larger and more statistically
significant than they
should be. Table 4.8: Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Operating
Based on the POMS data, Tax Rent Costs Value
it is difficult to distinguish Tax 1.000 0.513 0.283 0.718
a luxury penthouse from a Rent 0.513 1.000 0.626 0.451
more modest apartment. OperatingCosts 0.283 0.626 1.000 0.301
Information about the
Value 0.718 0.451 0.301 1.000
number of bedrooms and All correlations are significant at the .01 level
bathrooms is not (two-tailed).
available, nor is information about other unit amenities that might influence rent, such as
modem appliances, fireplaces or hardwood floors. Also missing from the data is
information about neighborhood quality, such as number of abandoned buildings and
proximity to employment centers. Furthermore, the size of apartments is not available,
since square footage was not included in the POMS.
Another critical missing piece of information is the metropolitan area, which can have a
significant impact on values and rents. For instance, Boston and Worchester are both
central cities in the northeast, but the rents apartments command in their respective
markets differ dramatically. This may explain why geographic variables do not appear to
be significant determinants of rent, value or taxes in most of the regressions. It appears
that the geographic information provided in the POMS is not specific enough to capture
the relevant differences in places that influence multifamily property income, expenses
and values.
By itself, the POMS does not include enough property- or unit-level information to
answer the property tax incidence question. However, some of this missing information
might be available through the American Housing Survey, which includes more detailed
information about unit and neighborhood quality. The POMS sample was taken from the
1993 American Housing Survey, but the data is not linked, for privacy reasons. Still, if a
researcher were to be able to gain access to information from these linked data sets, it
might provide enough information to control for unit and neighborhood quality, as well
as size of unit. This could feasibly allow a successful analysis of property tax incidence.
Chapter 5: Summary of Findings and Suggestions for Future Research
The question of property tax incidence is an important one for policymakers. As
mentioned at the beginning of this thesis, property taxes were the leading complaint of
POMS respondents. At the same time, it provides an important source of revenue for
cities and towns. Since a city tax base depends on the value of the property in it, and tax
rates can impact value, who bears the burden of the tax is a critical issue.
However, the answer to the question of who bears the burden of the property tax has
largely proved elusive. Past analysis of tax incidence was largely restricted to individual
metropolitan areas, and empirical studies provided conflicting results. Most studies
considered jurisdictions rather than properties. One of the reasons for this was the
scarcity of property-level information about multifamily operating expenses, revenues
and property values. Because of this, studies of property tax incidence rarely address
more detailed questions about what types of owners and renters are likely to bear the
burden of the tax, or how incidence is related to the characteristics of the housing itself.
There are several reasons why the POMS data is inadequate for the purpose of estimating
property tax incidence. First, the geographic information provided is so limited that the
data cannot be used to consider differences in tax rates between jurisdictions. Without
actual or effective jurisdictional tax rates, it is difficult to specify a model to estimate the
incidence of the tax. Even if detailed information about location were provided, the
number of useful observations would be too few to perform a useful analysis in most
metropolitan areas. Second, the data does not provide enough information to control for
unit and neighborhood quality, hence differences in rents. This is a particularly thorny
problem given that tax payments are highly correlated with both rents and values.
These issues are compounded by the inherent difficulties associated with measuring the
incidence of the tax. A complete estimation of property tax incidence would require not
only property level operating expense and income data, but detailed information about
local tax rates and public services. Even if actual or effective jurisdictional tax rates were
available, the property tax rate may often be simultaneously determined with rent and
property value. Finally, the incidence of the tax might be obscured by differential
property tax assessments within jurisdictions, especially if there are systematic
differences in assessments.
Nevertheless, the POMS is the first survey to systematically collect information about
expense, revenue and other characteristics of multifamily housing in the United States,
and provides interesting clues about the relationship between taxes, value, rents, net rents,
and other property characteristics.
Findings From Descriptive Analysis of POMS Data
" Effective tax rates vary considerably according to location. The highest effective tax
rates are in the Northeast and in central cities. The lowest rates are in the Western
region and rural areas.
" Effective tax rates also range widely between properties. Median effective tax rates
range from .78% in Western rural areas to 2.13% in Northeastern central cities.
" A significant percentage of properties reported tax payments and values that
correspond to an effective tax rate well above typical real or effective property tax
rates. While the reason for this is unexplained, properties with large tax payments
relative to their value have distinct characteristics. Most are located in Northeast and
Midwest central cities, offer less amenities, and are more likely to be medium-sized
properties. These properties are also twice as likely to be owned by a corporation.
* While there are significant differences in effective tax rates between regions, what
appears to really drive differences in tax payments are differences in property value.
e There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between effective tax rates and
the presence of low-income tenants. The same is true for properties with more than
100 units. Properties with lower effective tax rates are more likely to be located in
newer buildings in the South and West.
While the POMS data is not ideal, it does provide detailed information about operating
expenses, revenues and value. Future research might focus on finding ways to link this
data with other sources of information to improve its usefulness. One possibility is the
American Housing Survey, which provides more detailed information about property
location, as well as other housing characteristics that influence rents and operating costs.
APPENDICES
Appendix 1: Regression Output for Predicted Values of V
Dependent Variable: Value per Unit
Adjusted R Square: .226
(Constant)
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Appendix 2: Regression Output for
Predicted Values of Log(V)
Dependent Variable: log(value per unit)
Adjusted R Square: .301
B Std. Error t
(Constant) 7.950 0.494 16.081
Log(operating cost per unit) 0.333 0.063 5.293
Northeast suburb 0.045 0.139 0.325
Northeast rural -0.160 0.193 -0.831
Midwest central city -0.196 0.134 -1.463
Midwest suburb -0.275 0.150 -1.831
Midwest rural -0.143 0.164 -0.872
Built 1960 to 69 0.142 0.145 0.979
Built 1970 to 79 0.210 0.120 1.753
Built 1980 to 89 0.344 0.175 1.960
Built 1990 on 0.219 0.180 1.220
10 to 24 units -0.009 0.149 -0.059
25 to 49 units -0.106 0.181 -0.585
50 to 99 units -0.246 0.197 -1.248
100 or more units -0.259 0.187 -1.384
Units in building between 3 and 9 -0.003 0.151 -0.017
Units in building 10 or more -0.216 0.167 -1.299
Competes with private housing -0.028 0.094 -0.295
Competes with public housing -0.098 0.094 -1.043
Property value increased in previous year 0.173 0.086 2.012
Cash flow problems -0.411 0.144 -2.855
Rent control 0.132 0.139 0.952
Section 8 units at property 0.138 0.100 1.381
Owner is a partnership 0.047 0.096 0.493
Owner is a corporation -0.068 0.154 -0.442
Other type of owner 0.084 0.153 0.553
Low income tenants -0.467 0.107 -4.377
Tenants other/don't know -0.125 0.089 -1.399
Maintenance postponed 0.324 0.206 1.573
Resident manager 0.160 0.086 1.869
Air conditioning 0.099 0.097 1.015
Covered parking -0.099 0.130 -0.763
Uncovered parking -0.033 0.113 -0.288
Social events 0.028 0.139 0.202
Security system for property 0.111 0.131 0.851
Security system for unit 0.035 0.100 0.353
Laundry in unit 0.080 0.145 0.554
Elevator 0.065 0.138 0.475
Automatic sprinkler system 0.158 0.109 1.450
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